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BUSINESS-RELATED CRIMINAL LAW IN EUROPE:
A CRITICAL INVENTORY*
Klaus Tiedenann
Translated from German by Edgardo Rotman"
I.
Business-related criminal law has experienced in the last
decades a worldwide upturn and expansion that only few criminal
law scholars had anticipated. Even though globalization and financial
crisis are relatively new phenomena of business life, business-related
criminology1 had previously thrust these new phenomena under the
spotlight because of its relevance to multinational enterprises and
offshore banking. Traditionally, only balance sheet and other
accounting offenses - predominantly as a result of insolvency - were
the objects of reference for business-related criminology and
business-related criminalistics.2 Business-related criminology exper-
ienced a remarkable expansion by adding corporate crime and
This article is based in part on Professor Tiedemann's contribution in honor of
Hans Achenbach, edited by Uwe Hellman and Christian Schroder, C.F. MUller 2011.
Senior Lecturer in International and Comparative Law at the University of Miami
School of Law.
Translator's Acknowledgment: I would like to thank Nadia Amlaz, J.D.
Candidate and German Assessor, for her skillful and knowledgeable assistance on
this project.
Editor's Note: In order to preserve the integrity of the original work, the Editor
has decided to maintain the citations of the original author, Klaus Tiedeman, as
opposed to translating them into the traditional Bluebooking format. Notably, formal
citation in Germany, unlike the Anglo-American legal system is quite discretionary
as it is left to the editors and authors of the piece to determine how they wish to cite;
in this area, there is no right and wrong. Dr. Thomas M.J. Millers, Juristische
Arbeitstechnik und wissenschaftliches Arbeiten 141 (Verlag Franz Vahlen Munchen
2012).
' Compare with Tiedemann (eds.), Multinationale Untemehmen und Strafrecht
(1980), with contributions from Bacigalupo, Delmas-Marty, Kamiyama, Pedrazzi,
Rajan, Shibahara and Sieber; Tiedemann in the Geddchtnisschrift in honor of Sasse
Vol. 11 (1981) p. 629 et seq., and: Wirtschaftskriminalitiat und Wirtschaftsstrafrecht
in den USA und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1978).
2 In this respect see the classic work "Wirtschaftskriminalitdt" by ZirpinsITerstegen
(1963); see also Gassweiner-Saiko, Wesen und Probleme der Bilanzdelikte (1970).
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corporate delinquency. This expansion has been promoted by
Geerds, but also by Sutherland through the empirical research of cartel
offenses, by Kellens through the empirical research of bankruptcy-
related criminality, and by von Weber through the Ph.D. theses
written under his direction.3
At the same time, however, business-related criminal law,
both in theoretical understanding and in actual legislation, remained
attached to its historical root, which was the reinforcement of
governmental intervention in an economy considered "free." It was
administrative criminal law in a double sense: on the one side its
subject matter consisted of regulations issued by the state to protect
itself from threats against its economic interests, especially in times of
crisis, while on the other hand, it covered administrative sanctions
imposed by administrative agencies (Ordnungsstrafe), later called
administrative fines (Geldbue), together with typical administrative
measures, such as closure of businesses, occupational bans, and
seizure and disgorgement of profits. Well-known examples of this
situation are the German laws on business-related crimes of 1949
and1954, as well as the Dutch law on business-related crimes of
1951 (Wet op Economische Delicten).4
The blossoming and liberalization of the Western economic
system facilitated a vast number of damaging actions against its
participants and against governments. Such damaging actions to
individual and collective property could only fit, within the
3 On the development of research, see Tiedemann in Festschrift Lange (1976) p. 541
(542 et seq.), and in Festschrift Pallin (1989) p. 445 et seq., each with references; on
the development of legislation, see Achenbach Jura 2007, 342 et seq.
Translator's note: Fredrich Geerds contributed to this expansion of business
related criminology through his book on insurance abuses, among others
(Versicherungs Misbrauch: Strafrechtlche, Kriminologische und Kriminalistische
Probleme dieser sozialbetrugerischen Praktiken)., Luebeck : Schmidt-Roemild, 1991.
4 For a summary see Eb. Schmidt, Das neue westdeutsche Wirtschaftsstrafrecht
(1950): Achenbach ZStW Vol. 119 (2007) p. 789 (792, 799 et seq.), Jescheck, JZ
1959, 457 et seq. and Tiedemann, GA 1969, 71 et seq., see also OJZ 1972, 285 et
seq. On the evolution in the Netherlands, see de Doelder, in Schinnemann/Sudrez
Gonzalez (eds.), Bausteine des europtiischen Wirtschaftsstrafrechts, Madrid
Symposium for Klaus Tiedemann (1994) p. 311 et seq., and previously A. Mulder,
Wet op de Economische Delicten, 2nd edition 1970 as well as ZStW Vol. 88 (1976)
p. 281 (284 et seq.).
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traditional arsenal of the criminal law systems, in the category of
crimes against property, primarily fraud through false pretenses.
This crime, which only took shape in the 19th century, was limited
to private business dealings between two or three persons. The
provision on fraud through false pretenses had to be stretched to its
limits in all cases where the criminal courts were faced with new
forms of business-related criminality. The ostensibly restrictive
French model of escroquerie,5 with its often imitated deceit
requirement contained in the expression "manceuvres frauduleuses"
- as well as at first sight the narrow truffa6 of the Italian Penal Code
through its requirement of "artifizi o raggiri" 7 - has been interpreted
by the courts in such a way that it almost amounted to punishing
simple lies. For the French system, this exclusive focus on deceptive
maneuvers was even more serious because the Penal Code of 1810
completely omitted the material element of property damage in its
definition of fraud through false pretenses.8 Very similarly, the
British Fraud Act of 2006 still refrains from including the occurrence
of harm in its provisions, and formulates the notion of deceptive
action in a broad manner, either through the inclusion of an implied
"false representation" or through a wrongful omission
encompassing also deception through computers and systems, and
deception about legal questions.9
Translator's note: Escroquerie is the French term meaning fraud through false
pretenses.
6 Translator's note: Truffa is the Italian term meaning fraud through false pretenses.
7 Translator's note: Artifizi and raggiri are the Italian terms meaning scams and
deceptive behavior.
8 For a detailed treatment of the subject, see T. Walter Betrugsstrafbarkeit in
Frankreich und Deutschland (1999) p. 80 et seq., 239 et seq., and most recently
Pradel/Danti-Jitan, Droit P6nal Sp6cial (5th edition 2010) nos. 872 et seq. p. 515 et
seq, n. 890 p. 527 et seq. (Deprivation of the freedom to dispose as "pr6judice"
[damage]). -Antolisei/Grosso, Manuale di Diritto Penale Parte Speciale Vol. I (15th
edition 2008) p. 367 et seq. ("la semplice menzogna" as "raggiro" [the simple lie as
deceit]).
9 See on this topic Farrell/Yeo/Ladenburg, Blackstone's Guide to The Fraud Act
2006 (2007) n. 2. 32 et seq.; du Bois-Pedain ZStW Vol. 122 (2010) p. 325 (328 et
seq.).
Translator's Note: Fraud Act 2006, Chapter 35; Royal Assent 8 (November
2006).
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In contrast, the German provision regarding fraud through
false pretenses (Betrug), the same as the Swiss and Austrian provisions,
uses the narrowing element of harm to property, which the German
court decisions have significantly expanded by underscoring the
economic impact of the offense as a guiding principle. This broad
conception of fraud through false pretenses based on economic harm
has only recently been significantly narrowed demanding danger to
property or fraudulent inducement to contract.1 0
The German concept of deception excludes legal circumstances
and future events, and thereby attempts to assure an objective basis for
rational decision-making. This attempt has, in turn, been reversed in
great part through the inclusion of "internal" facts, such as intentions
and beliefs, whereas the Greek law on fraud through false pretenses,
very similar to the German law, does not recognize "internal" facts as a
point of reference in determining the existence of the deception." In
the case of gross contributory fault on the part of the victim, the
imposition of criminal liability for fraud is frequently considered
inadequate by German scholarship. To reach this position, German
scholarship refers to Swiss criminal law, where decisions of the Federal
Court have, as a matter of principle, negated the legal requirement of
malicious intent (Arglist) of the perpetrator when the victim appears to
have failed to take adequate self-protective measures, or when the
victim has special business experience.12 The logical consequence
would be to investigate the victim, and also in the cases of fraud on a
massive scale, where the victim is unknown, to assume attempt
liability on the part of the perpetrator. In any event, this restriction is
considered in Switzerland to be an inconsistency in the system.1 3 It is
possible to find a relatively balanced solution in the Spanish law
regarding fraud through false pretenses. After having at earlier times
copied from the French Model, the Spanish law introduced in the
1o For a summary, see Tiedemann, in Strafgesetzbuch Leipziger Kommentar, 12th
edition 2011, § 263 n. 168 et seq. with further references.
1 Bitzilekis in Festschrift Hirsch (1999) p. 29 (40 et seq.); Tiedemann (fn. 10), n. 60
Vor § 263 with further references.
12 For a summary see Arzt in Basler Kommentar Strafgesetzbuch 11 (2003) Art. 146
57 et seq.; Hurtado Pozo, Droit Pnal Partie Sp6ciale (2009) § 40 n. 1180 et seq,
each with references.
Arzt, in Festschrift Tiedemann (2008) p. 595 (598 et seq.).
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estafa'4 provision of its new Penal Code of 1995 the requirement that
the perpetrator carry out a deception ("engahto bastante")1 5 of such a
magnitude as to be capable of inducing a mistake.16 This is precisely
the formula that has been recently used by the German Federal Court
of Justice in recurring cases, but hardly with the intent to
fundamentally modify its decisions in the cases of true advertising
material directed to selected addressees.17
German scholarship maintains that through a pro-European
interpretation of national law, the directive 84/450 EEC and directive
2005/29 EC "concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial
practices in the internal market" imposes a partial limitation on the
protection against fraud, restricting it to the average reasonable
consumer.1 8 If this scholarship opinion prevails, the German concept
of fraud will need to be readjusted accordingly. In this respect,
deception to the public is distinguished from deception to the
individual, which is meaningful from a crime policy perspective, as
the latter is more dangerous and therefore requires more protection
for the victim.19
14 Translator's note: Estqfa is the Spanish term meaning fraud through false
pretenses.
15 Translator's note: "Engafio bastante" is Spanish for sufficient deception.
16 See on this topic Ludwig, Betrug und betrugs.hnliche Delikte im spanischen und
deutschen Strafrecht (2002) p. 21 et seq.; Bajo Fernandez, Los delitos de estafa en el
C6digo Penal (2004) p. 38 et seq.; Perez Manzano, in Schfinemann/Suirez/Gonzilez
(fn. 4) p. 213 et seq; Vives Antdn/Gonzalez Cussac in Vives Ant n et al., Derecho
Penal Parte Especial (2nd edition 2008) p. 413 et seq. with further references.
Translator's note: Codigo Penal (Penal Code), article 248.
1 BGHSt 47, 1 (5); see also BGHSt 46, 196 (199) and OLG Koblenz NJW 2001,
1364; approving Beukelmann in v. Heintschel-Heinegg (eds.), StGB Kommentar
(2010) § 263 n. 9 and Fischer StGB Kommentar, 58th edition 2011, § 263 n. 14.
18 In this respect, see Hecker, Strafbare Produktwerbung im Lichte des
Gemeinschaftsrechts (2001) p. 322 et seq; Janssen in Achenbach/Ransiek (eds.),
Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht (2nd edition 2008), chap. V I n. 65 et seq; Ruhs in
Festschrift Rissing-van Saan (2011) p. 567 (576 et seq.); Soyka wistra 2007, 127 et
seq; Satzger in Satzger/Schmitt/Widmaier (eds.), StGB Kommentar (2009) § 263
n.68; Vergho, Der Ma8stab der Verbrauchererwartung im Verbraucher-
schutzstrafrecht (2009) p. 297 et seq.; Wohlers/Kudlich, ZStW Vol. 119 (2007) p.
366 (368 et seq.).
19 Tiedemann, LK (fn. 10) n. 40 Vor § 263 and already in Festgabe BGH Vol. IV
(2000) p. 551 (555).
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II.
At least at this point, it is clear that further development
of the European business-related criminal law has been influenced
both by the European Union as source of law, and by comparative
law. Both factors lead - in a unified economic space that allows free
movement of goods, services, and payment instruments - towards the
broad harmonization of criminal law provisions, as expressly established
at the end of 2009 in the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty of the
European Union. The criminal law jurisdictional catalogue20
contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU), as well as the supranational prohibition of competition
restraints, concern the Special Part 21 of the criminal law. However,
both may be interpreted as an implied authorization to regulate
specific areas of the General Part under the reservation to respect the
Member State's different traditions.22
The General Part of the current European penal codes has
primarily developed basic general legal principles in the structuring
of the notions of attribution 23 and validity,24 as well as rules of
priority that are at the core of the common European "philosophical"
20 Translator's note: The Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union contains under the title "Categories and Areas of Union
Competence" (Part One Title I Article 2) a distribution among the European Union
and the Member States of exclusive and common areas for legislation and policy-
making.
21 Translator's note: Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 2007,
2008/C115/01. The Special Part of the criminal codes belonging to the Civil Law
tradition define specific offenses, while the General Part addresses issues that cut
across the individual offenses, such as accomplice liability, attempts, defenses and
other general provisions.
22 Tiedemann, Wirtschaftsstrafrecht Besonderer Teil (3rd edition 2011) n. 54 and in
Festschrift Jung (2007) p. 987 (1002 et seq.), as already in Festschrift Geerds (1995)
p. 95 (110 et seq.); approving H. Stein, Die Regelungen von Thterschaft und
Teilnahme im europaischen Strafrecht am Beispiel Deutschlands, Frankreichs,
Osterreichs und Englands (2002) p. 7 et seq. with further references.
23 Translator's note: The offense cannot be attributed to the perpetrator when, for
example, the causal link is absent or the perpetrator is found insane.
24 Translator's note: Penal Codes establish rules of spatial validity, i.e. geographical
scope of their application, and temporal validity (statutes of limitation).
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body of thought. These basic principles, which belong to the domain
of criminal jurisprudence and the rationalistic legal thought of the
Enlightenment, are based on abstract and systemic reasoning. Both
basic principles and rules of priority have been reflected and refined
in the General Part of the present European penal codes.
1. The task of the European Court of Justice in
Luxembourg of consolidating the business-related criminal law's
rules and principles into a supranational general part on the subject,
initially resulted from a confrontation of the Court with retroactivity
issues and situations of necessity in the area of administrative
offenses contained in both cartel law and European Coal and Steel
Community law. This development is explained by the fact that
from its beginnings, the European community possessed in this area
its own power to impose sanctions, while the "fined" corporations
enjoyed the right to appeal these decisions to the European Court of
Justice.
Decades of European Court of Justice jurisprudence,
subjected to intensive legal comparison, led to judicial recognition of
the legality and culpability principles, as well as the development of
an extensive theory about the perpetrator, which culminated in the
legal notion of the "unitary economic enterprise" composed of
groups of companies inside or (partially) outside the European
Union.25
A partial codification, including a circumvention provision,26
was carried out in 1995 on the basis of a comprehensive draft from
Bacigalupo, Grasso, and Tiedemann, through the Council Regulation No
2988/95 of December 18, 1995, "on the protection of the European
25 Achenbach, GA 2004, 559 (568) correctly refers to the "model of community-
wide valid law of repressive sanctions." For summaries see Dannecker/Biermann in
Immenga/Mestmacker (eds.), Wettbewerbsrecht EG/Part 2 (4th edition 2007) n. 112
et seq. Vor Art. 23 VO 1/2003; Kindhauser in Frankfurter Kommentar zum
Kartellrecht (status 2009) Art. 81 n. 97 et seq. Tiedemann Wirtschaftsstrafrecht
Allgemeiner Teil (3rd adition 2010) n. 259 et seq. and in Festschrift Jescheck (1985)
p. 1411 et seq., each with references. For a general overview of the law on fines for
antitrust violations, see Achenbach in Achenbach/Ransiek (fn. 18), chap. 111 6 n. 10
et seq.
26 Translator's note: The perpetrator is punishable even when he has tried to
circumvent the law by adjusting his behavior to conform to its wording, but actually
violating its spirit.
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Communities' financial interests" against "irregularities." This
codification is related to the international convention of 1995 (PIF-
Protection des Int~rets Financiers) 27 that has been in force since
2002, which established among other provisions the criminal
responsibility of the "heads of businesses" (Art. 3) in an effort to facilitate
the functional efficiency of this European Union main sector.28
2. The issue of the criminal responsibility of corporations,
especially important for business-related criminal law, was already
introduced by Noll in the German debate during the 49th German
Jurists' Conference regarding the decision of the Swiss Federal Court
in the case "Bilhrle," 29 of great notoriety at the time. The case
continued the ongoing Swiss and German debate about the criminal
responsibility of the owners of corporations (including holding
companies!) and of executives for criminal offenses committed by
other members of the enterprise. It seems that today it is recognized
that there is a guarantor position3O on the part of the management
body in the German-speaking ("Germanic") legal sphere, with
exception of Austria, as a result of the power of direction and the
organizational responsibility of the management body.3' Such
27 Translator's note: Protection of Financial Interests.
28 The Regulation and Convention are also published in Tiedemann
Wirtschaftsstrafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (fn. 40) Appendix 1. 1. and 8. p. 131 et seq.,
147 et seq.
29 SchwBGE 96 (1970) IV 174 et seq.; for subsequent case law and discussion in
Swiss literature see Heine, SchwZStrafR Vol. 121 (2003) p. 24 (29) and Hurtado
Pozo, Droit P6nal Partie G6ndrale (2008) chap. 18 § 3, 4 E n. 1333 with numerous
further references.
Translator's note: BUihrle was the only personally liable partner of a limited
partnership that delivered weapons to South Africa in violation of an embargo
decision. Bilhrle later learned about the deliveries and only mentioned that they
should cease without taking further measures. The Court found Btthrle a co-
perpetrator of the embargo violation because his special command position imposed
on him a special duty to act immediately.
30 Translator's note: The "guarantor position" has been conceived by the German
criminal law doctrine as providing the foundation for the criminalization of
omissions in situations where the perpetrator has a legal duty to act.
31 See Achenbach (fn.12), chap. 1 3 n. 32 et seq. with references for German
literature; de Doelder in Festschrift Tiedemann (fn. 13) S. 563 (570 et seq.); Hurtado
Pozo (fn.11); Tiedemann (fn. 25) n. 185, each with further references; for an in-
depth analysis, see H. Stein (fn. 22) p. 31 et seq. (Germany), 116 et seq. (France"
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guarantor position is also recognized in recent Spanish scholarship.
Both the legal doctrines of responsabilitj d'autrui (responsibility for
others) in French criminal law and vicarious liability in English
business- related criminal law demonstrate that this criminal
responsibility for the behavior of others is clearly deemed
appropriate.
The same assumption was the basis of both "The
Implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member States" (2002)
under the supervision of Delnias-Marty, and Tiedemann's 2002 draft of
Euro-criminal offenses. In a lecture given at the University of Luzern
in 2006, Roxin correctly interpreted the criminal responsibility for acts
of subordinates as an autonomous form of indirect perpetration,32
whereas some divisions (Strafsenate) of the German Federal Court of
Justice, as it is generally known, have evolved towards establishing
an indirect perpetration of crimes through the dominion exercised by
an organization (Organisationsherrschaft). For this indirect
perpetration neither the good nor bad faith of the immediate actor is
relevant. The same applies to the fungibility of immediate
perpetrators and to the principal's knowledge of every single
offense. 33 The Dutch penal code has included in § 51 a comparable
provision. There the person behind the scene in fact plays an
"actually controlling role." The Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) had
already recognized a "functional perpetration" in the organizational
context.34
responsabilit6 p6nale du fait d'autrui"), 190 et seq. (Spain), 253 et seq. (Austria), 326
et seq. (England -"vicarious liability"). Supplemented by Greve in
Schnnemann/Suirez Gonzal6z (fn. 4), p. 313 (317 et seq.-"ansvarplacering");
Crespo Responsabilidad penal por omisi6n del empresario (2009), Lascurain in
Schnnemann/Suirez Gonzdlez (fn. 4), p. 35 et seq. and Nieto Martin in Festschrift
Tiedemann (fn. 13) p. 485 (496); Nisco Controlli sul Mercato Finanziario e
ResponsabilitA Penale (2009) p. 139 et seq. with comprehensive references of Italian
and German literature.
32 Roxin SchwZStrafR Vol. 125 (2007) p. 1 (17 et seq.) with references.
3 BGHSt 48, 331 (342); 49, 147 (163 et seq.) with commentary by Tiedemann JZ
2005, 45 et seq.; BGH wistra 1998, 148 (150) and NStZ 1997, 544; for the opposing
view see especially Roxin (fn. 32) p. 19 et seq. and Rissing-van Saan in Festschrift
Tiedemann (fn. 13) p. 319 (401 et seq.) each with further references.
34 See de Doelder (fn. 8), p. 312 ("feitelijk leiding geven"), (fn. 31), p. 565 et seq.
(theory of "the functional offender in an organisational context") with references.
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3. The issue of the criminal punishment of management and
executive staff acting at the top of the enterprise logically leads to the
additional issue of criminal responsibility and punishment of the
enterprise itself. Paragraph 30 of the Administrative Offenses Act
(Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz [OWiG]) only provides in this respect
for the possibility of the imposition of monetary penalties on
corporate organs or on the executive staff who have committed
crimes or administrative offenses, including violations of the duty of
supervision (§ 130 of the Administrative Offenses Act).35 While Italy
recognizes only the quasi-criminal responsibility of associations,
German law represents the tail-end of a European-wide trend,
promoted by the European Union, to introduce a genuine criminal
responsibility for legal entities, following in this way the modern
Anglo-American tradition. This was first undertaken by the
Netherlands in 1951, by France following its new Penal Code of 1994,
and by Switzerland since 2003. After introducing the corresponding
reforms, the same has been recognized by Belgium, Austria, Portugal,
Scandinavia, Finland and Eastern Europe, and most recently by Spain
with the partial reform of December 23, 2010.36 The comparison
between the Spanish and Swiss alternatives is of particular
dogmatiC37 interest. Following the French model, Spain seeks a
3 On the expansion of the circle of addressees and perpetrators, Achenbach (fn. 25),
chap. 1 2 A n. 1 et seq. and wistra 2002, 441 (443), on the predicate offenses of
§ 1300WiG chap. 13 E n. 38 et seq. with numerous references.
36 For an up-to-date overview (with the exception of Spain) see Kelker in Festschrift
Krey (2010) p. 221 et seq.; previously de Doelder/Tiedemann (eds.), Criminal
Liability of Corporations (1995) (with extra-European and European national reports
on Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland and United
Kingdom); additionally: Delmas-Marty, Greve, Rostad, Ruiz Vadillo and
Schiinemann, in Schinnemann/Suirez GonzAlez (fn. 4): Denmark, Norway and
(dated) Spain. On Austria see Schick in Festschrift Tiedemann (fn. 13), p. 851 et seq.
who understands monetary fines imposed on entities as a real criminal sanction that
has been falsely labeled. Corporate fines in Sweden, understood as real criminal
sanction, pose a similar problem ("firetagsbot") (Cornils/Jareborg, The Swedish
Criminal Code, Brottsbalken, 2000, p. 22). On the terminology within this context
see Schroeder in Festschrift Tiedemann (fn. 13) p. 353 (354 et seq.).
Translator's note: The expression "dogmatic" has been adopted by countries
belonging to the Civil Law system that follow the German model, meaning the
scholarly reconstruction of positive law. In this scheme, all the logical and systemic
approaches are elaborated around positive law, which is respected as a "dogma."
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"classic" solution by limiting the addressees of criminal sanctions to
legal entities only, and admits as predicates only those crimes
committed by institutional organs and by legal or de facto business
managers, relying for the latter on a cautious expansion of
commercial law (Art. 31 bis section 1 of the Penal Code [C6digo
Penal]). Thus, the Spanish legislator uses the attribution model
("modelo vicarial") 38 as a basis for the determination of the scope of
liability according to legislative materials.39 This model is also used
for the German administrative offenses (Ordnungswidrig-
keitenrecht), 40 but not when the production and distribution of goods
(as decided by the Supreme Federal Court BGHSt 37, 106 (114)) and
the discharge of waste (as decided by the Supreme Federal Court
BGH NStZ 1997, 544 (545)) constitute an action of the association
itself.
In sum, the Administrative Offenses Act (OwiG)
coincides with the new Spanish law insofar as it treats the mentioned
groups of persons in the same way as persons with supervisory
duties who, through their control failures, make the commission of
offenses by their subordinates possible. The requirement of a full
demonstration of this causal link will, of course, diminish the
practical application of the new regulation considerably. To the
contrary, the new Swiss criminal law (Art. 102 of the Penal Code)
introduces from the outset organization failures not only as a basis of
attribution, but also as an element of the definition leading to the
imposition of criminal sanctions against each and every enterprise,
including those that are not acting formally as a legal entity.41 The
Translator's note: The attribution model uses the representation theory that has
traditionally operated in private law, attributing to a legal entity the behavior of its
organs. Thus, the intent or negligence of their administrators is considered to be the
intent or negligence of the legal entity itself.
3 Translator's note: Statement of reasons contained in the governmental proposal
and parliamentary discussions.
40 Representative in this respect Achenbach (fn.25), chap. I A n. 3 and 5; see also
Frankfurter Kommentar (fn. 16), n. 47 vor § 81 GWB; approving: Tiedemann
(fn.16), n. 244 (also relating to the French Code P6nal). For the new Spanish
criminal law, see Rodriguez Mourullo in Festschrift Tiedemann (fn. 13), p. 545 (557
for ajustification of the draft, statute in German translation p. 558).
41 Translator's note: Article 102 of the Swiss Penal Code establishes that "If a felony
or misdemeanor is committed in an enterprise in the exercise of commercial
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Swiss Penal Code expressly obligates the enterprise itself to take
adequate organizational measures to prevent the occurrence of
offenses capable of being committed by any employee or worker,
regardless of their position in the corporate hierarchy. Thus, the
failure to control ("faulty risk management") may trigger the
criminal responsibility of the whole enterprise and, in this way the
Swiss have established their own enterprise blameworthiness. The
evidence of such blameworthiness demands in practice a
comprehensive disclosure of the enterprise structure and its crime-
prevention measures and provisions.42 This is also true for the new
Italian law on administrative sanctions and for the English law on
bribery since 2011 (UK Bribery Act of 2010). Also, the new Spanish
solution is based on blaming the legal entity itself, because the law
expressly excludes as irrelevant the wrongful acts of natural persons
from enterprise blameworthiness (Art. 31 bis section 3 of the Spanish
Penal Code). This type of blameworthiness is actually social
culpability, and is conceived as a violation of the duty of self-
organization primarily in cases of negligence and omission. From a
legal norms perspective, this legal duty derives from the public's
prevailing expectation of careful behavior. More specifically, this
duty is derived from organizational and supervisory duties, from the
size of the association, the association's position in the market,
its type of activity, and its business policies. This conforms to the
case law of the EU Commission regarding competition offenses,
which follows the French administrative theory of "faute de
service." 43 As with European Union practices, psychological
activities in accordance with the objects of the enterprise and if it is not possible to
attribute this act to any specific natural person due to the inadequate organization of
the enterprise, then the felony or misdemeanor shall be attributed to the enterprise. In
such cases, the enterprise shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 5 million francs."
42 Geiger Organisationsmlingel als Anknilpfungspunkt im Untemehmensstrafrecht
(2006); Hurtado Pozo in Festschrift N. Schmid (2001) p. 204 (206 et seq.);
Macaluso La responsabilit6 p6nale de l'entreprise (2004) p. 148 et seq.; Pieth in
Festschrift Jung (fn. 15), p. 717 (724 et seq.), each with further references.
43 See especially, among others, Nieto Martin (fn. 19), p. 499; Paliero in Festschrift
Tiedemann (fn. 19), p. 503 (522 et seq.); Pieth (fn. 26), p. 725. On the practice of the
EU, see Dannecker/Biermann (fn. 16), n. 169 et seq. and Kindhtiuser (fn. 16), n. 36




conditions such as intent and purpose should in fact be determined
in natural persons and, through the legal norms, be attributed to
the legal entity as a whole. This characterization of intent within the
act that conforms to the definition of the offense, and which is
attributed to the enterprise through the legal norm, does not, from a
German legal viewpoint, constitute a systemic breach. In sum,
according to our evaluation, "organizational fault" is the legitimizing
argument for criminal responsibility of associations in Spanish and in
Swiss criminal law. However, with the exception of Switzerland and
Italy, organizational fault is not the only controlling element of
corporate liability. In any event, the Spanish Penal Code does not
require proof of the organizational deficiencies in order to attribute to
the organization predicate offenses committed by organs and
representatives.
In all, German law provides a foundation for legitimizing these
new legislative solutions when the primary duty to take the
necessary measures of supervision according to § 130 OWiG
(Administrative Offenses Act) is understood as a primary duty of an
association as owner of the enterprise.44 This duty of supervision
should, however, not be interpreted as concerning the organization
as a whole. The Spanish, Swiss, and Italian literature also refers
constantly to our article on the new version of § 30 of the
Administrative Offenses Act revised by the Second Act on
Combating Economic Crime about organizational deficiencies as a
legitimation for associational responsibility, which was published in
NJW 1988 p. 1169 et seq.45
Translator's note: In France, the Conseil d' Etat (Council of State) has gradually
distinguished between faults committed by a government official within the scope of
his employment (faute de service) and personal faults.
44 Achenbach (fn. 25), chap. 1 3 E n. 42, (fn. 40), n. 68 et seq. and in Coimbra-
Symposium for Claus Roxin (1995) p. 283 (288); Engelhart, Sanktionierung von
Untemehmen und Compliance (2010) p. 415, 509 et seq.; Tiedemann (fn. 25), n. 248
and N1W 1988, 1167 (1173), 29, each with references; for opposing view, see
Schiinemann in Festschrift Tiedemann (fn. 13), p. 429 (437).
45 See especially, among others, Bajo Ferncindez/Bacigalupo Derecho Penal Eco-
nmico (2nd edition 2010), chap. V n. 21 et seq. and89; Hiurtado Pozo (fn. 12) n.
1260 and 1265 as well as (fn. 42), p. 205; Nieto Martin (fn. 31), p. 498 (et seq.);
Paliero (fn. 43), p. 507 et seq. (p. 511 on the draft Grosso regarding a corresponding
regulation of the General Part of the Italian Penal Code); Rodriguez Mourullo (fn.
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4. Compliance programs undoubtedly belong to the
organizational measures necessary for commerce in the case of
corporations that reach certain size, an idea that has been imported
from the U.S. as a possible method to avoid criminal responsibility. 46
Although they do not reflect any specific legal principle, compliance
programs can produce indirect legal effects. Similar to their
predecessors, the voluntary codes of conduct for multinational
enterprises, compliance programs play a remarkable role in the
determination of duty violations that constitute the crime of
fraudulent administration (Untreue), and also, in a very general
way, determining the duty of care violations in negligent crimes and
omissions. In Germany, § 161 of the Stock Corporation Act
(Aktiengesetz) correctly indicates that the "Deutscher Corporate
Governance Kodex" (German Corporate Governance Code)
contains only recommendations. The observance or non-observance
of such recommendations, together with the reasons for doing so, is
part of the disclosure obligation and therefore must be declared in a
company's annual final report. In the case "Kirch v. Deutsche Bank,"
the German Federal Court of Justice decided for the first time that
falseness of this report is punishable pursuant to the criminal
provisions regarding false balance sheets contained in the
Commercial Code.47 Likewise, the infringement of corporate
compliance rules was among the bases for the conviction of the
Siemens enterprise for its fraudulent administration (Untreue)
through payments of bribes in the case Siemens/ENEL decided
by the German Federal Court of Justice in 2008.48
5. The evidence obtained from comparative legal research of
the existence of similarities between the general parts of business-
related criminal laws should be interrupted at this point with an
40), p. 559.
46 In further detail, see Sieber in Festschrift Tiedemann (fn. 13, p. 449 (468 et seq.)
and also Nieto (fn. 31), p. 489 et seq. and Tiedemann (fn. 25), n. 8a and 8b, each
with references; see also Engelhart (fn.28), p. 502 et seq. (sector-specific duties).
47 BGH ZIP 2009, 460 (464); see TadtmannlSchauer, ZIP 2009, 995 (999) with
further references - On § 331 Nr. I HGB see Achenbach, NStZ 2005, 621 (625).
48 BGHSt 52, 323 (335) with commentary by Ransiek NJW 2009, 95 et seq., Ronnau
StV 2009, 246 et seq. as well as Festschrift Tiedemann (Fn. 13), S. 713 (721) and
Satzger NStZ 2009, 297 et seq.. Compare also BGHSt 50, 331.
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almost anecdotal example taken from the unappealing area of
criminal liability that stems from defective products. This area
typically presents causation problems that can hardly be resolved
through criminal law theory. These problems occur in recurring cases
of health damage, or death resulting from the use of a product, when
either the causation or the toxic substance is unknown.
The German Federal Court of Justice decided in 1990 in the
case of a leather spray produced by Erdal, that it is enough to
demonstrate the existence of a causal link between the use of the
product and the ensuing bodily harm (in the case at bar the unlawful
result was primarily a pulmonary edema) when all other possible
causes may be excluded by the trier of fact, namely contingent or
alternative ones. Furthermore, the Court decided that an explanation
of the "why?" was not required.49 Because of its predominantly
procedural approach, this decision has been vividly debated in
German scholarship, as it has also been the case with the Bifhrle
decision in Switzerland.5 0 When the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish
Tribunal Supremo had to decide the considerably more serious case
of contaminated canola oil ("colza")51 the judge- rapporteur travelled
to Freiburg im Breisgau 52 to study the arguments for and against
liability. The Spanish Criminal Chamber eventually followed the
analysis of their German colleagues, a reasoning which was also
favored by the vast majority of German scholars. The Spanish
decision of April 23, 1992, was published in NStZ 1994 pages 37 et
seq. in German language.
49 BGHSt 37, 106 (111 et seq.) with commentary by Beulke/Bachmann, JuS 1992,
737 et seq., Kuhlen NStZ 1990, 566 (f) see also JZ 1994, 1142 et seq.
50 Translator's note: See fn 29.
5 Translator's note: This is a case about intoxication that caused widespread health
damage and death to thousands of individuals throughout Spain. The epidemic was
connected with the importation of canola oil that had been mixed with two percent of
anilin. The Court found that, in order to establish criminal causation, it was not
necessary to determine the precise mechanism that had caused the result, so long as a
correlation or a connection could be found between the events in question, and
alternative causes could be excluded.
52 Translator's note: In the library of the Institute of Business-related Criminal Law
and Criminology at the University of Freiburg, and in the library of the Max-Planck
Institute of Criminal Law.
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III.
To begin with, one should close certain gaps in the Special Part
of the Penal Code that result from developments in the field of
technology.
1. The most obvious example is the failure of the provision
of fraud through false pretenses to include computer manipulations,
because they lack the element of human error. With the exception of
France, where the general erroneous impression of the system
operator is considered sufficient,5 3 almost all European penal codes
introduced special provisions criminalizing such manipulations. New
provisions also became necessary in the area of forgery of
instruments because of the requirement of visibility.5 4 The national
legislators were faced with new technical challenges, such as the
intrusion into information systems ("hacking") (also aimed at
computer and software espionage), the capture of data ("phishing"),
as well as data intrusion and data alteration ("computer-sabotage").
The legislators responded to these challenges with the creation of an
abundance of criminal law provisions in compliance with the
2001 European Convention on Cyber Crime and in line with several
EU directives. These new offenses were summarized and further
harmonized in the controversial EU proposal on "Attacks against
Information Systems" etc. (COD 2010/0273). The equally fully
automated cashless payment transactions were subjected to a special
protection because, according to the civil rules regarding the use of
Pradel /Danti-Juan (fn. 5) no. 873 p. 515; T. Walter (fn. 5), p. 435 et seq. each
with references.
54 Translator's note: The German provision on fraud through false pretenses is only
applicable when the perpetrator generates error upon a victim that in turn causes the
victim to dispose of property. Because a machine cannot suffer from such error, the
legislator introduced the provision of computer manipulation pursuant to § 263 (a) to
close this gap in criminal liability. A parallel development took place in the area of
forgery of instruments. Even though hardcopies of electronic data are recognized as
an instrument within in the meaning of § 267 of the German Penal Code, this
provision fails where data already entered is being manipulated at the processing
stage. § 267 does not apply in such cases because "instrument," within the meaning
of § 267, is only a physical embodiment of thought that is visually perceivable. The
legislator introduced § 269 (forgery of material data) to close this gap.
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either credit cards, debit cards, or traveler's checks, mistake of
the other party to the transaction cannot be assumed. Art. 148 of
the Swiss Penal Code is partially viewed as a model and imitated by
numerous countries, but without the Swiss self-protection
reservation clause.55 This model was followed in Spain only after the
partial reform of 2010, whereas in Germany it was limited to credit
cards, without providing good reasons for this limitation.5 6
2. In the related field of banking and securities markets, the
introduction of new criminal provisions and the reform of old ones
were compelled by Switzerland's significance as a financial center,
by the scandals in the financial market in the 1960s and early 1970s,
and by the readiness of the EU Commission to issue directives
binding its Member States.
The criminal provision of money-laundering, completely
unknown in the old Europe until the Swiss reforms and often
perceived in Switzerland as "lex Americana"; and the
criminalization of abuse of inside information on securities, both of
which originated in the United States; together with market price
manipulation, already well known in Germany, hardly attracted the
attention of European criminal law scholars. This was likely because
the new criminalization of money- laundering was also based on the
International Convention on the Fight against Organized Crime, and
also because criminal provisions regarding stock markets were not
included in the Penal Code (with the exception of Switzerland and
the new 2010 version of the Spanish Penal Code), but were rather
placed in special ancillary statutes, such as the German Securities
Exchange Act. Criticism about the prohibition of money-laundering
ignited as its sphere of application continuously expanded. As areas
of private professional activity were absorbed by the State, the
international debate about the legal interests protected by the norm
brought little clarification, and this legal comparison revealed a EU-
5 Translator's note: Article 148 of the Swiss Penal Code exempts for criminal
punishment when the use of credit or debit cards in cases of inability or
unwillingness to pay affects enterprises that could fairly have been expected to take
reasonable self-protective measures.
56 Persuasively advocating a legislative expansion see Mohrenschlager in LK (fn.
10), § 266 b n. 4.
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wide failure to harmonize the structuring of criminal provisions.5 7
In the cases of insider abuse and market manipulation,
investors' assets are hardly ever harmed by actions that conform to
the definitions of fraud through false pretenses or fraudulent
administration,58 and this is why at this point in time one must
abandon the classification of business-related crimes as property
crimes; although these definitions can still be minimally expanded,
considering for example, that infringements to foreign trade law
embargos, and customer-friendly or neutral cartel agreements were
fitted into the definition of property crimes.
3. A first theoretical step towards a convincing solution
was offered by the recognition of "intermediate legal interests,"
which, endowed with relative autonomy, can be located between the
valuable interests of individuals and the superior welfare interest of
the community that are incapable of being protected through
criminal sanctions.5 9 Above all, the so-called Frankfurt School, and a
considerable part of the Italian criminal law scholarship, have
In detail see Vogel, ZStW Vol. 109 (1997) p. 335 et seq.; additionally: Bajo
Ferndndez/Bacigalupo (eds.), Politica criminal transnacional para la lucha contra
el blanqueo de capitales (2009); Gentzik Die Europlisierung des deutschen und
englischen Geldwaschereistrafrechts (2002); Jacs -Potyka Bekampfung der
Geldwasche in Europa (2007); Pieth Die Bekimpfung der Geldwascherei (2002);
Siska Die Geldwasche und ihre Bekampfung in Osterreich, Deutschland und der
Schweiz, 2nd edition 2007; see also Yenisey, in Festschrift Tiedemann (fn. 13), p.
1191 et seq. (Turkey).
58 Fischer (fn. 12), § 263 n. 13 and 13 a, § 266 n. 52; Tiedemann in LK (fn. 10) n.
323 see also Wirtschaftsstrafrecht und Wirtschaftskriminalitat 2 (1976) p. 69 with
references; Vogel in Assmann/Schneider (eds), Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, 5th edition
2009, n. 14 and 15 Vor § 38 each with further references - similarly for Switzerland
Hurtado Pozo in SchUnemann/Sudrez GonzAlez (fn. 4) p. 407 (411, see also p. 413 et
seq.).
5 Tiedemann Tatbestandsfunktionen im Nebenstrafrecht (1969) p. 119 et seq., 400 et
seq.; see also: Wirtschaftsstrafrecht und Wirtschaftskriminalitat 1 (1976) p. 50 et
seq, 83 et seq. and in LK (fn. 7) § 265 b n. 14; approving Botke in SchUne-
mann/Suarez Gonzalez (fn.4), p. 109 (112) and Lampe in Festschrift Tiedemann
(fn.13), p.7 9 (101) as well as Schiinemann, JA 1975, 793 (798); in detail Hefendehl
Kollektive Rechtsgtiter im Strafrecht (2002) p. 175 et seq. with further references. -
Approving in part Martinez-Bujdn irez Parte General del Derecho Penal Econ
mico (1998) p. 100 et seq. On the reform's significance see Achenbach in Festschrift
Tiedemann (fn. 13), p. 47 (57) with further references.
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declared themselves against such intermediate legal interests because
they are prone to terminological abuse (moreover, such legal interests
do not carry the constitutional foundation required by the Bricola 60
School of Bologna).61
The second theoretical step emphasized, on the one hand, the
unquestionable supra-individual nature of state property and other
social financial assets in which social aims do not directly serve the
economy, and on the other hand, the indispensable nature of certain
instruments of today's economic life, such as the already mentioned
(non-cash) transactions and credit, especially in the form of business
loans from banks or other suppliers. We can of course expect the
objection that we are again dealing here with the protection of
property, because a consideration of all factors can only lead to the
conclusion that social property is only the sum of individual
properties. 62
A third epistemological step merges these approaches
into the concept of institution that has been well established in legal
thought since Maurice Hauriou.63 Institutions are conceptualized as
social phenomena that not only exist in the sociological sense, but
must also be acknowledged in the economic and legal spheres
60 Translator's note: Franco Bricola has developed a constitutionally oriented theory
of legal values and interests protected by criminal law. See Franco Bricola, Politica
criminale e scienza del diritto penale, 1997.
Hassemer Theorie und Soziologie des Verbrechens (1973) p. 75, 77 and JuS 1990,
850; see also Hassemer/Neumann in Nomos Kommentar Strafgesetzbuch, 3rd
edition 2010, n. 108 et seq. vor § 1; Manes ZStW Vol. 114 (2002) p. 724 et seq. with
references; on the same topic previously Tiedemann Tatbestandsfunktionen (fn. 59),
p. 121 and Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 1 (fn. 59), p. 86. In the same way Nisco (from
Bricola/Sgubbi-School) (fn. 31), p. 91 et seq. with further references.
62 See BGHSt 36, 130 (131) with comments by Kindhauser JR 1990, 520 et seq.; on
the same topic again previously Tiedemann Tatbestandsfunktionen (fn.59), p. 118
and in LK (fn. 10) § 265 b n. 14; in agreement Hefendehl (fn.59) p. 262; in the same
way Wohlers in Monchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (2006) § 265 b n. I
with further references - On the Italian concept of savings and investments
("risparmio") as a supra-individual legal value, Nvisco (fn. 31), p. 91 et seq.
("mercato finanziario come istituzione").
63 Translator's note: In his "Precis ementaire de droit constitutionnel," 2nd edition,
p. 75 (1930), Maurice Haurion defines institution as a social organization created by
a power that has continuity, because it is based on a fundamental idea accepted by
the majority of the group members.
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in order to deserve criminal law protection. We are dealing here -
to mention only some important examples - with the competition
and the freedom in the formation of market prices, guaranteed by the
economic constitution (Wirtschaftsverfassung); 64 the banking system,
with its specific tasks of granting loans and processing payments;
commercial accounting with respect to actual or potential creditors
through balance sheets and bookkeeping; the social insurance system
as institution for the financial security of workers; private insurances
protecting against entrepreneurial and other risks such as economic
risks and life risks; state-owned assets and their system of collection
and distribution for social purposes.6s These institutions manifest
themselves in an external formal way as supervisory authorities that
have recently been in a similar way organized as panels of judges
("Autorit6s Administratives Ind6pendantes" [Independent Admin -
istrative Authorities], in Germany, for example, as the Federal
Competition Authority (Bundeskartellamt) and the Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority (BaFin)).
64 "Wirtschaftsverfassung" is a legal term meaning in Germany the totality of the
legal rules of constitutional rank that organize the economy, as well as the
fundamental norms belonging to the European Union's supreme legal order.
65 Lampe in Festschrift Tiedemann (fn. 13), p. 90, 98 et seq.; Tiedemann
Wirtschaftsstrafrecht General Part (fn. 25), n. 45 and 58 see also previously
Tatbestandsfunktionen (fn. 59), p. 122, 372 and Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 1 (fn. 59), p.
51, 84 et seq.; Vogel in Schfinemann (ed.), Strafrechtssystem und Betrug (2002) p.
89 (101); Wohlers Deliktstypen des modernen Prhventionsstrafrechts (2000) p. 159
et seq. and (fn. 40) § 264 n. 8. Similar approaches already in "value makers" (State,
Church, Legal System) in Erik Wolf Die Typen der Tatbestandsmdf3igkeit (1931) p.
56. Roxin in Festschrift Hassemer (2010) p. 573 (588) designates public
administration, currency and tax system as well as the ecological system, and as
Wolf in part, directly approaches superior values related to the common good. Has-
semer/Neumann (fn. 61), n. 131, 134 and 140 design as universal legal interest at
least data processing and denominate as institutions, apart from property and
administration of justice, insurances (sic) and in general the economy. A summary of
Achenbach's "phenomenological" view can be inferred from Jura 2007, 342 et seq.
(commercial accounting, check and bill of exchange). Hans Achenbach correctly
finds that fraud through false pretenses perpetrated against an indeterminate plurality
of victims, major fraud and the corresponding fraudulent administration, pursuant to
§§ 263, 266, have a supra-individual dimension (compare §§ 263 sec. 3 no. 2, 266
sec. 2 of the German Penal Code); similarly Tiedemann (fn. 22), n. 1.
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Criminal law secures the essential conditions for the
proper functioning of such institutions according to their hierarchical
placement in the social system of values. The special criminal law
definitions are primarily related to the correspondent administrative
institutional duties to warn, as for example the rules of conduct
regarding fair information and disclosure (publicity and
transparency) in the case of securities listed in the stock exchange.66
These special definitions are acknowledged under the
constitutional criterion of proportionality in cases where the fraud
provision and other general property crimes do not provide sufficient
protection or are inadequate, especially because one does not
specifically deal here with individual loss of economic assets, but
rather with the special vulnerability to harm inherent to each
institution (this is called "offendibilitA" by Marinucci's Milan
School).67 In this sense, the legal values protected by enacting the
stock-exchange related crimes include the transparent formation of
prices for securities and the preservation of equal opportunity for
market participants. Additionally, in the case of tenders (for example,
the electronic ones through the internet), and auctions, the main
focus is on the procedural formation of prices through competition,
as emphasized in the Spanish Tribunal Supremo's clear legal
decisions, 68 and also what the German Federal Court of Justice refers
to when it discusses "procedure-related offenses." 69 If we consider
66 On a comparative analysis and on German law, see Seminara in Festschrift
Tiedemann (fn. 13), p. 1085 et seq. and Ziouvas in Festschrift Tiedemann (fn. 13), p.
123 (133 et seq.), p. 140 ("institutional special duties"); in agreement regarding
Spanish law Arroyo Zapatero in SchUnemann/Sudrez Gonzalez (fn. 4), p. 387 (388
et seq.) and Bajo Ferndndez/Bacigalupo (fn. 45), chap. XII n. 405 et seq. with
further references. On regulatory models of stock market-related criminal law
advocated in European countries Vogel (fn. 58), n. 20 et seq. Vor § 20 (a) and n.5 et
seq. Vor § 38.
67 Translator's note: See G. Marinucci, E. Dolcini, Corso di diritto penale, vol. 1, 3rd
ed., Milan 2001, p. 549 et seq. where the authors find a definite "offendibilitai"
(criminal vulnerability) in certain collective entities, among them the savings
institutions.
61 Compare Bajo Ferndndez/Bacigalupo (fn. 45), n. 460 with references.
69 BGRSt 49, 201 (209) following T. Walter GA 2001, 131 (140); approving
Tiedemann in LK (fn. 7), § 298 n. 9 with further references.
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damage to price formation already as a type of property damage,70
then the general definition of fraud suffices; however, in other cases
a special definition becomes necessary, as adopted, for example, by
countries such as Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Italy, Spain, and Germany.7' At the same time, it is remarkable from a
systemic viewpoint how the Spanish Criminal Code has compressed
the space devoted to manipulation in the formation of prices. The
decisions of the criminal tribunals in Germany and Austria, as well as
part of the Swiss scholarship, predicate fraud-related harms on the
basis of the hypothetical market price, which can be difficult to
ascertain. The same Swiss scholars also discuss the existence of fraud
in the performance (Leistungsbetrug),72 pursuant to the Swiss federal
legislation on administrative criminal law.73 Alternatively, the tax
evasion and the surreptitious obtainment of subsidies are apt to be
deemed frauds because of their likely potential to affect property. To
that extent, one deals here with the special protection of public
property as an institution. This institution provides for special rules
of conduct that govern legal relationships emerging from taxes and
subsidies. In this respect, the protection of public property
possesses a special status.74 Because these public assets are tied to a
normative goal, a large part of the German, Italian, as well as the
70 In this sense OLG Frankfurt a. M. NJW 1990, 1057 (1058 - Stream Development
Rhine 1) following Tiedemann Wettbewerb und Strafrecht (1976) p. 17 et seq. (and
now in LK [fn. 10] § 263 n. 165 with further references).
71 Bender Sonderstraftatbestdinde gegen Submissionsabsprachen (2005) p. 201 et seq.
(France), 218 et seq. (Italy); Tiedemann in LK (fn. 10), n. 11 et seq. Vor § 298
(Austria, France, Italy, Spain, Great-Britain, also the Netherlands). On France
additionally: T. Walter (fn. 8), p. 314 et seq.
72 Translator's note: Fraud in which the perpetrator promises to carry out a
performance that he or she does in fact not carry out and nevertheless obtains a
consideration for that performance. A well-known subcategory is welfare fraud, the
fraudulent obtainment of a social benefit.
7 Arzt (fn. 12), n. 85; Tiedemann in LK (fn. 10), n. 11 and 12, each with references.
74 Berger Der Schutz Offentlichen Vermogens durch § 263 StGB (2000) p. 6 et seq.;
Tiedemann (fn. 22), n. 92, 98, 122 and 133 as well as previously on this topic
Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 2 (fn. 58), p. 118 et seq.. From a comparative legal perspective
Morales Prats in G mez Colomer/Gonzilez Cussac (eds.), La reforma de la Justicia
Penal - Festschrift fur Klaus Tiedemann (1998) p. 49 (64 et seq.) (also on social
security law).
BUSINESS-RELATED CRIMINAL LAW
Spanish criminal law theory favor the special regulation of
intentional misuse of subsidies with separate legal provisions that
stand apart from the traditional fiscal criminal law special regulation.
The majority of national legislators have meanwhile provided for
such special regulations, while the EU has prescribed them because
supranational subsidies have been increasingly manipulated, and
artificial controls7 5 can only prevent such manipulations to a limited
extent. Hans Achenbach has correctly characterized this steering of
the economy through subsidies as "highly criminogenic."7 6 However,
the fraudulent acquisition of national subsidies is still covered by the
general provision of fraud in Austria, Greece, Great Britain, and
Sweden, and in Switzerland is only applicable to cantonal subsidies,
whereas for confederate subsidies, only the less grievous
administrative criminal law sanctions are applicable. The subsequent
deviation of legally obtained EU subsidies from their purpose is
criminalized through special provisions in practically most of the EU
Member States (with the exception of Great Britain and France),
because in these countries such behavior is neither contained in the
definition of false pretenses nor in the definition of embezzlement or
fraudulent administration.7
4. Business-related corruption is not covered by the fraud
through false pretenses provisions, and is only partly addressed
by the fraudulent administration provision. For this reason, the
offenses requiring the involvement of public officials
(Amtstragerdelikte), which were created according to the earlier
model contained in the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,
were expanded to include foreign public officials pursuant to the
OECD Convention of 1997, and were recently acknowledged by the
Great Britain Bribery Act of 2010. In addition, the bribery of
employees and agents of private business enterprises and their
readiness to accept bribes are criminalized separately. Traditionally, a
7 Translator's note: Artificial controls are those exercised by administrative
supervisors and inspectors. In normal business life there are natural controls because
the buyer has the possibility to scrutinize the quality of the product (caveat emptor).
In the case of subsidies there is a unilateral relationship with the beneficiary. This is
why artificial controls are necessary.
7 6 Achenbach (fn. 25 (GA), p. 565 (following Tiedemann).
n See Tiedemann in LK (n. 7), § 264 n. 20 21a.
2013 157
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
provision specifically applicable to corruption cases was neither
known in the Romanic criminal law system nor in Greece.
Consequently, the EU legislator was confronted with considerable
resistance in these countries. Nonetheless, these provisions were
included both in the Convention of 1999 on Corruption of the
Council of Europe and in the United Nations Convention of 2003.
Accordingly, one deals here with the protection of genuine
competition, modernly expressed as fair competition in the
mandatory EU Framework Decision of July 22, 2003, which has not
been implemented by Germany within the deadline prescribed by
such Framework Decision. One also deals with the protection of
service contracts with an offense similar to fraudulent
administration. This protection of fair competition has earlier been
incorporated into Swiss Law (in its Federal Law against Unfair
Competition), French Codes (Code Napoldon and Labor Code (Code
du Travail), and the Netherlands Penal Code ([Wetboek van
Strafrecht]).78
In current German practice, acceptance of advantages by
purchasing agents of department stores (Media Markt case) 79 and
by HMO doctors (Ratiopharm case)80 belonging to the social
insurance system has played a controversial role in the central
question of whether accepting an advantage is "undue" in a specific
78 For summaries see Tiedemann in LK (fn. 10), n. 22 et seq. Vor § 298 and Vogel in
Festschrift Weber (2004) p. 395 et seq.
79 Translator's note: Philips' employees bribed purchasing agents of large electronic
stores, including employees of the chain Media Markt/Saturn. Their purpose was to
bring more Philips household appliances into the stores. In two instances, in 2002
and 2003, Philips employees offered the purchasing agents bonuses if they increased
the sales of Philips appliances. In these cases, the majority of German scholars
focuses on how likely it is that the grantor of the advantage enjoys a preferential
treatment because of the advantage. Some indicators are the value of the advantage
granted and its likelihood to squeeze out competitors. See Tiedemann,
Wirtschaftsstrafrecht BT n. 207 (3rd edition 2011).
80 Translator's note: The case Ratiopharm: The Regional Court of Hamburg
sentenced in December 2010 a physician, general practitioner, to 90 daily fines at
300 euros per day for passive corruption pursuant to § 299 of the German Penal
Code. Between 2004 and 2005, the physician had accepted seven checks in the total
amount of 10,641 Euros from a medical representative as a commission for the
prescription of drugs produced by a specific pharmaceutical company. The medical
representative was also sentenced to 90 daily fines.
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case. However, this appeal to business ethics, also employed by the
EU legislator, is just as vague as a similar element introduced by the
EU - a breach of duty not included in the express terms of a service
contract. To this end, the 1906 British Prevention of Corruption Act,
originally held as a model for German law, simply used the
word "corruptly" until its replacement by the Bribery Act of 2010.
Business corruption should be narrowly defined, in the same
way as the general fraudulent administration provision (in Spain:
corporate fraudulent administration), as recommended by the
Spanish scholarship.8 1 The definition should be similarly restricted to
serious breaches of duty, and the bribee should have the authority to
decide or the power to influence, in accordance with the reasons
stated in the above-mentioned international legal instruments. 82
Instead of this restrictive interpretation conforming to the
Constitution and the EU, the new Greek criminal law (law number
3560/2007) enumerates the sources of legal duties exhaustively, and
in this manner attains a higher degree of legal certainty concerning
the criminal provisions than it might have through a restrictive
judicial interpretation.
As a general problem, an additional question arises as to
whether the consent (knowledge) of the principal precludes a finding
of criminal liability for the administrator (this happens in the EU
regulation because of the way it deals with the crime of fraudulent
administration), and whether criminal liability must be barred based
on the constitutional principle of proportionality that underlies the
European Court of Justice decisions on export of dual use goods8 3 in
cases where the degree of quality of the merchandise favored by the
buyer or the medication prescribed by the physician is beyond
dispute. This is suggested by a significant part of the German
scholarship that stands against constant judicial decisions.84
Bajo Fernandez/Bacigalupo (fn. 45), chap. XIII n. 68; Muhioz Conde in Spanish
Festschrift Tiedemann (fn. 74), p. 137 (149).
82 Tiedemann in LK (fn. 10), § 299 n.46 with further references and in Festschrift
Rissing-van Saan (fn. 18) p. 685 (690 et seq.).
83 Translator's note: Goods and technologies are considered to be dual-use when
they can be used for both civil and military purposes.
84 See BGH NJW 2006, 3290 (3298) (Allianz Arena Munich) with opposing reviews
Gercke/Wollschliger wistra 2008, 5 et seq., Kienle/Kappel NJW 2007, 3530 et seq.,
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5. In questioning the relevance of the exclusion of actual
danger from offenses of abstract endangerment,85, we return again to
the General Part to find another mechanism of modern business-
related criminal law: the so-called aptitude offenses (Eignungsdelikte).86
Aptitude offenses can be found where protection of the public is
involved, especially consumer protection, and in situations where
fraud through false pretenses only applies to a limited extent because
this crime requires individuals as victims in most legal systems (supra
Part I). In such cases, the aptitude offenses work as catch-all provisions
that do not take into account the occurrence of a harm, and that are
based on the capacity of a public offer to deceive an average
reasonable person (the special provisions of the Spanish Penal Code
do not mention the element of aptitude because it is already
incorporated into the general notion of fraud through false pretenses
[Betrug]). Insofar as the propensity to cause harm is concerned,
including harm to health, general or statistically- based causation
Klengel/Rilbenstahl HRR p. 2007, 52 et seq. and Tiedemann in Festschrift Gauweiler
(2009) p. 533 (541 et seq.). For restrictive interpretation advocated by the
scholarship, particularly in the case of bribery for the purpose of promoting sales,
see Tiedemann in LK (fn. 10), § 299 n. 41 and n. 42 with further references -For a
summary of criticism of the envisioned expansion of § 299 see Liiderssen in
Festschrift Tiedemann (fn. 13), p. 889 et seq. On the criticism of the "empty formula
or general clause" of honesty, loyalty etc. by the (Italian and Spanish) scholarship de
la Mata Barranco, in Festschrift Tiedemann (fn. 13), p. 869 (872 et seq.) with
further references.
85 Translator's note: Offenses of abstract endangerment punish behaviors only
because they are typically dangerous, as opposed to offenses of concrete
endangerment that require a concrete danger to the legal values or interests
protected.
86 Translator's note: Aptitude offenses were formerly labeled abstract-concrete
endangerment offenses; this term has been replaced by the terms aptitude offenses or
potential endangerment offenses. A feature that distinguishes aptitude offenses from
pure abstract endangerment offenses is partial concretion. The characterization of
aptitude offense depends on the particular offense in question. For example, in
environmental criminal law, in order to establish criminal liability certain substances
do not only have to be pollutants per se, but also in order to incur criminal liability
for water pollution (§ 324 of the German Penal Code) certain concrete factors must
be present, such as the course and force of the wind. Another example is food fraud
where not only the food itself has to be noxious per se, but also the health and age of
the victim are necessary concrete factors to determine criminal liability (§§ 58, 59
Lebens- und Futtermittelgesetzbuch [German Food and Feed Code]).
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applies, not individual causation, which is difficult to prove, as for
example, in the case of use of "unsafe" products that lead to bodily
harm or even death (compare with the above-mentioned German
and Spanish cases, supra II. 5.) The prime example of such aptitude-
based offenses is provided by modern environmental criminal law, but
only where this law does not operate with threshold8 7 values,8 8 and
by business-related criminal law, which already contains the
traditional provisions regarding false advertising and introduction of
falsified food, cosmetics, fodder, medicines, finished materials or articles,
and wine products into the stream of commerce. In the EU Member
States, the element of deception, controlled by the notion of
"consumer expectation," is shaped by numerous noncriminal
regulations and directives set forth by the European Union, as for
example the Council Regulation (EC) number 834/2007 on organic
production and labeling of organic products (the German criminal
provisions can be found in § 12 of the Organic Farming Act of
December 7, 2008 and § 3 of the Eco Labeling Act of January 20,
2009).
The European Union relies in the area on consumer
protection more on information and warnings than on repression,
which remains however indispensable as a criminal law response to
infringements when prevention fails. As a final example, one can
mention, on the one hand, the area of protection of intellectual and
industrial property, and on the other hand, the protection of the
employee and the labor market. Because of the international
magnitude of product and trademark piracy, the EU has imposed on its
member states in 2004 the introduction of criminal sanctions for
serious offenses into their laws. In the countries belonging to the
87 Translator's note: As for example, the minimum tolerable amounts of pollution.
" On the different regulation models see Tiedemann Die Neuordnung des
Umweltstrafrechts (1980) p. 23 et seq.; from a comparative law view see Knaut Die
Europhisierung des Umweltstrafrechts (2005) p. 146 et seq. (Austria), p. 151 et seq.
(Sweden), p. 156 et seq. (Portugal), p. 160 et seq. (Spain), p. 166 et seq. (Denmark),
p. 169 et seq. (Finland), p. 179 et seq. (Switzerland), p. 185 et seq. (France), p. 201
et seq. (Belgium), p. 204 et seq. (Italy), p. 210 et seq. (Greece), p. 217 et seq.
(Netherlands), p. 221 et seq. (Great Britain). On aptitude offenses in Spanish and
German criminal environmental law see Silva Sanchez in Spanish Festschrift
Tiedemann (fn. 55) p. 151 (163 et seq.).
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Romano-Germanic tradition labor criminal law, elaborated in detail by
scholars, became subject of the EU criminal law jurisdiction only with
the Treaty of Lisbon at least as far as the residence and immigration
of workers is concerned. 89 Above all, the trafficking of aliens, like
other areas of business-related criminal law, spills over into the ambit
of organized crime.
89 See Achenbach (fn. 3), p. 343 and 346; Bbxler, wistra 2011, 11 et seq. from a
comparative law viewpoint on this area Arroyo/Nieto in Tiedemann (eds.),
Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der Europiischen Union - Freiburg-Symposium (2002), p.
199 et seq., 213 et seq. On both areas summarizing Tiedemann Wirtschaftsstrafrecht
Besonderer Teil (fn. 22), n. 600 et seq.
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